In the November 1998 issue of Economic Development Quarterly (EDQ), Dick Thornburgh (former governor of Pennsylvania) and Edward Hill (EDQ editor and professor at Cleveland State University) presented valuable commentaries regarding possible future directions for federal economic development policy (Hill, 1998; Thornburgh, 1998) . The U.S. Economic Development Administration (EDA) funded the research that led to both of these articles as part of its ongoing commitment to exploring economic development issues of national importance. We are grateful for the opportunity to respond to the articles and continue this crucial dialogue. We shall consider each article separately, then try to distill certain common lessons and discuss the EDA's policy response to the important issues raised. We make no attempt to speak for our colleagues in other federal agencies.
THORNBURGH
Thornburgh's article summarizes the 1996 findings of a panel he chaired for the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA). This study was commissioned to examine how federal programs have helped or impeded innovative local economic development efforts. Thornburgh begins by questioning whether federal policy can reasonably be expected to have any significant effect on national economic development (NAPA, 1996) . He argues-properly, we believe-that the federal government has often failed to perform the kind of evaluations necessary to document genuine success. Nonetheless, he gives three reasons why we should continue to support federal involvement in economic development. First, even if the federal government has been ineffective, it has the potential to have an impact in the future. Second, the federal government provides necessary financial support for state and local economic development agencies that do have an impact. Third, there are certain jobs only the federal government can do.
The NAPA panel included experts with exceptionally diverse perspectives. It is significant that this diverse group concluded that the federal government has an important role to play in assisting local economic development. Of course, we agree with this conclusion. However, we are not so sure that Thornburgh's first two arguments provide the most compelling case for maintaining that strong federal presence. First, if the federal government has failed to make a difference after 35 years of effort, why should the public continue to support a losing strategy? Patience is required in economic development policy, but that patience cannot be infinite. In fact, the federal government has made a difference. Partly in response to Thornburgh's criticism, the EDA has recently subjected several of its programs to independent performance evaluations. Evaluations of EDA support for public works, defense adjustment, incubators, disaster relief, and trade adjustment all show that federal investment has led to improved performance in local projects (Aguirre International, 1996 Burchell, 1997a Burchell, , 1997b Haughwout, 1999; Molnar et al., 1997; Walker, Pettit, & Roberts, 1998) .
It is much harder to prove that federal agencies are not simply moving jobs between locations. However, the evidence does show that the vast majority of EDA-funded projects operate in areas of severely underused resources, areas where most experts agree that increased employment represents a net national gain (Bartik, 1990) .
1 In his evaluation of the EDA's Public Works Program, for instance, Burchell (1997b) found that EDA projects are located in areas where the unemployment rate and percentage of people in poverty are 30% to 40% higher and per capita income is 40% lower than state and national levels.
Thornburgh's second argument is essentially that we should use federal taxation to fund state and local economic development activities. In fact, virtually all EDA's grant funding goes to support locally initiated projects.
2 However, it is difficult to argue in favor of strong federal involvement if the federal role is simply to pay the bills. After all, if the states and localities believe that economic development policy is important, they can fund it themselves with their own tax revenues, increased by an offsetting federal tax cut. Federal funding is certainly justified on equity grounds because distressed areas usually lack the tax capacity to carry out economic development activities on a par with their wealthier counterparts.
3 Historically, however, it has proved difficult to build political support for a strong and consistent national investment program on equity grounds alone.
Thornburgh's third rationale for federal involvement is crucial. Interestingly, he chooses not to describe the federal role using a traditional rationale, such as the need to correct market failures. Instead, he focuses on the themes of learning, leveraging, linking, and leadership. Although we are in broad agreement with the governor on many issues, we believe this discussion tends to underestimate the unique contribution made by the federal government in economic development. Let us consider each of his themes in order.
Learning
Thornburgh argues that the federal government needs to help practitioners learn about state and local strategies that work. We agree; in recent years, the EDA has funded a number of best-practice studies expressly for this purpose (Goldman, 1995; State Science and Technology Institute, 1997; Youtie et al., 1999) . 4 Still, identifying successful programs is only part of what federally sponsored research needs to do. The EDA tries to support more detailed research, that can help to identify the specific conditions under which different innovative strategies work best. 5 The agency also tries to identify significant challenges to economic development and ways to overcome them. Unfortunately, funding for research has been especially hard-hit by congressional budget cutting. In real terms, the EDA's research budget today is less than 10% of what it was just 20 years ago.
6 Despite this, the EDA has continued to fund unique research projects in areas that have been neglected by others. Two projects that come immediately to mind are the EDA's Assessment of Technology Infrastructure Needs in Native Communities (Riley, Nassersharif, & Mullin, 1999) and Outmigration, Population Decline, and Regional Economic Distress (Feser & Sweeney, 1998 geographically. The report also identifies innovative solutions developed by tribes acting in partnership with other governments, nonprofit organizations, and private firms. The second report identifies several different ways that outmigration can undermine local economic development. Both of these reports result from detailed research of complex economic development problems that affect many people nationally. Both reports describe how those problems can be manifested in different ways in different contexts, and they recognize that there are no simple solutions to the problems considered. This type of serious research almost certainly would not have been done without federal assistance.
Leveraging
Thornburgh argues that the federal government needs to be more effective at leveraging. At least in the EDA's case, recent evaluations suggest that federal programs have been very successful at leveraging funding from other sources. The evaluation of our Public Works Program, for instance, finds that on average, every dollar of EDA funding is matched by $10 of private funding and one additional dollar from other public sources (Burchell, 1997b) . 7 Thornburgh also uses the term leveraging in a different sense, arguing that the federal government should use financial incentives to help states overcome the pressures they are under to engage in cutthroat industrial recruiting, to employ short time horizons, and to fund projects in relatively affluent areas. We agree. Indeed, the federal government does use incentives for these purposes. the EDA, for instance, routinely provides planning funds that can help a locality develop more effective strategies, simultaneously making the area more attractive to both private and public investors. Still, financial incentives are not always the only-or even the most efficient-means to achieve desired results. Rather than paying states bonuses to fund needy areas, the EDA targets those areas directly. Rather than bribing states to cooperate with one another, the EDA's funding review process disqualifies those projects that result in employers relocating from one area to another.
Linking
Thornburgh argues that there is excessive redundancy and fragmentation among federal economic development programs. To solve these problems, he recommends consolidating programs and centralizing control over federal economic development policy, possibly within the White House. We believe these are extreme proposals, likely to have unintended consequences if implemented. More broadly, although some duplication undoubtedly exists, it is important to question the orthodoxy that says redundancy and fragmentation are rampant among federal programs.
Let us consider the issue of redundancy first. Redundancy exists when multiple programs serve the same purpose. It is a problem mainly when it leads to an overallocation of resources that drives down the return on federal investment. Thornburgh supports his claims of redundancy by citing a formidable list of existing federal programs. However, the presence of multiple programs need not, by itself, indicate either duplication or waste. Consider the case of revolving loan funds (RLFs), which Thornburgh (1998) identifies as one example of many "duplicative or overlapping federal programs" (p. 293). To be sure, RLFs are a common tool adopted by many different federal agencies. Despite this, a study by the Corporation for Economic Development (CFED) identifies only 15% of 603 RLFs surveyed that actually receive funding from more than one federal source (Levere, Clones, & Marcoux, 1997) . As the researchers note, that number is almost certainly low due to statistical weaknesses in the federal data. Nonetheless, the data certainly do not support a conclusion of massive duplication of effort. Even if there were duplication, it does not necessarily imply waste. Indeed, CFED finds no strong evidence of diminishing marginal returns in those RLFs that receive funding from multiple federal programs. RLFs funded by multiple federal agencies exhibit default rates and job creation figures (normalized per dollar of lending) that are essentially identical to RLFs with funding from only a single federal source.
Fragmentation is a slightly different issue, resulting from extreme disintegration of activities. As Thornburgh properly notes, it can lead to excessive transaction costs for activities such as fund raising, reporting, and administration. We agree wholeheartedly that reducing these costs is Straub, Robinson / RESPONSE 259 important. However, linking programs and consolidating them are not the same thing. We see no inherent reason to expect that program consolidation and policy centralization will increase flexibility among state and local developers, as Thornburgh asserts. Notable experts on government reform have often concluded just the opposite: that centralization reduces flexibility (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993) . We are more circumspect. Evidence from the private sector, for instance, suggests that flexibility has more to do with the particular production arrangements used by firms than with size or centralization per se (Gertler, 1992) . Isserman (1997) points out that prior experiments with federal funding consolidation (i.e., block grants) have not eliminated complaints from local government about inflexible and burdensome rules and regulations.
We are also concerned that centralization of control over policy is likely to undermine Thornburgh's effort to maintain stable federal funding over political cycles. It is quite likely that, if federal economic development had been controlled by the White House in the past, the EDA and kindred agencies would have been closed down years ago, placing tremendous stress on the local programs they support.
Although there may well be excessive fragmentation in specific cases, there are also good reasons for the pronounced division of labor observed in federal economic development. First, the general scarcity of funds available has led Congress to assign investment responsibilities to different agencies and to impose rules and eligibility requirements to ensure that funds go to the specific investment areas where they are needed most. In these instances, some portion of transaction costs associated with fragmentation results from a legitimate and competing public interest for accountability. Growth in the total number of programs has also resulted from agencies trying to respond to local needs. As we see clearly in the RLF case, different agencies have created programs that are specialized to their unique constituency and expertise.
9 As in the private sector, increased transaction costs are often the price we pay for disintegration, that results in greater specialization and flexibility.
Does this mean we must take high transaction costs for granted? Of course not; much can be done (and is being done) to reduce transaction costs in existing programs, without going so far as massive program consolidation. To continue our RLF example, the EDA is currently sponsoring a program in cooperation with the private sector and the RLF community to demonstrate the feasibility of securitizing economic development loans. One goal of the program is to develop voluntary standards for documentation, contracts, and underwriting practices that would be available to all RLFs, regardless of which agency funded them. Over the long run, adopting such standards would not only lower transaction costs but also improve the overall quality of documentation in the industry, making RLF loans more attractive to private sector investors (Richardson, 1996) . Because they would be voluntary, the standards would guarantee RLF operators continued flexibility to originate, structure, and service loans in a manner most appropriate for their needs.
Leadership
Thornburgh acknowledges that the federal government has created some innovative programs, but he treats these as exceptions, arguing that federal programs are frequently designed so narrowly that they inhibit innovation. We believe this view underestimates both the degree and the substantive quality of the contributions federal programs have made to their partnerships with state and local governments. Consider just two of Thornburgh's examples.
First, he contrasts local and federal programs, stating that "local economic development works in a different way-by choreographing numerous incentives and individual projects in service of a well-conceived strategy" (Thornburgh, 1998, p. 292) . We agree that many states and localities have done a good job of strategic planning. However, that planning has often been supported and enhanced by federal funding and technical assistance, and it has often been initiated by federal requirements (Dabson, 1999) .
Similarly, Thornburgh (1998) states that "states and localities led the way in bringing universities into economic development activities" (p. 294). Even if we ignore the long history of the federal land-grant colleges and university-based federal labs as agents of economic development, the
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We see no inherent reason to expect that program consolidation and policy centralization will increase flexibility among state and local developers.
EDA's own University Centers date to 1963. Most of these centers are created, funded, and operated as the result of close federal cooperation with states.
The EDA has long recognized that successful economic development is ultimately a local endeavor, but that does not mean the federal government is a passive player. The federal government has tremendous resources and expertise-and yes, leadership-to contribute. As with all partnerships, we believe the best outcomes result when the full capabilities of each partner are recognized and used fully.
HILL
Hill's article was prepared as a contribution to a 1997 compendium by the Economic Development Assistance Consortium (EDAC). Edited by EDAC Director Marcus Weiss and the late Bennett Harrison, the report consisted of a loose collection of 12 papers in different policy areas (Harrison & Weiss, 1997) . Hill is less ambiguous than Thornburgh in his support for strong federal policy. Whereas Thornburgh sees the federal government primarily as a source of funds for state and local government, Hill describes in detail a series of roles that only the federal government can fill. These include market failure arguments, but Hill goes further. He explains with some precision why the federal government should serve as a patient source of capital and moderate the activities of economic development organizations that operate at varying spatial scales.
Hill also believes that current debates over federal economic development policy have tended to confuse community development and economic development. Such confusion can lead to federal policy that consists more of "a list of programs" than a coherent policy (Hill, 1998, p. 301) . In trying to clarify the two types of development activity, Hill argues that economic development should focus on expanding national production and efficiency and that it should operate at the regional scale-most closely defined by labor market areas. By contrast, community development should focus on quality-of-life and consumption issues, including income redistribution, and it often operates on a much more localized geographic scale. Confounding of the two often occurs because it is politically expedient to promote community development programs by arguing that they increase competitiveness and productivity. This confusion can distort community development activities, causing them to sacrifice their redistributive goals. Unlike Thornburgh, Hill argues that economic development and community development programs and budgets need to remain independent to ensure that both efforts maintain their importance and focus.
Hill echoes the traditional distinction between efficiency and equity goals in federal economic development policy. He points out that many efficiency-promoting programs are establishment oriented, whereas redistributive programs tend to be place or person based. When discussing federal equity goals, Hill differentiates between assisting distressed regions and increasing the earning potential of disadvantaged workers, pointing out the obvious (but often overlooked) fact that poor people may not live in poor regions. Finally, Hill argues that the fragmentation and redundancy of federal programs has a certain political logic and that efforts to consolidate federal programs are likely to bog down in political wrangling, with very little to show in the end.
We welcome Hill's effort to bring greater precision to these discussions, especially his attempt to distinguish between community and economic development. He openly acknowledges that his categories have fuzzy boundaries and that it can be difficult to separate the two (especially in rural areas, where people often work and live in the same place). We would take the argument further. The simple fact is that the quality-of-life and household consumption concerns of community development are not easily separated from the regional growth and productivity concerns of economic developers. There are two points to make here. First, dramatic economic changes over the past two decades have led many communities to conclude that economic development is about not just the pace of growth but also the quality of growth. That is, many communities now believe they have options regarding the type of growth they pursue.
10 This is easily seen in the proliferation of innovative programs in such varied areas as Smart Growth, sustainable development, and new models for workforce development (Youtie et al., 1999) . Second, many experts now conclude that, Straub, Robinson / RESPONSE 261 for those communities choosing development paths focusing on innovation and wage growth, attention to quality-of-life and consumption issues is essential to success. Thus, for instance, Appelbaum and Batt (1994) summarize the arguments of a growing number of labor economists that more cooperative workplace arrangements are critical to increasing innovation and productivity. Similarly, Bluestone and Harrison (2000) make a compelling argument that inequality and slow wage growth can undermine these "high road" economic development strategies by deterring labor force participation and personal investment in skill upgrading and by retarding growth in aggregate demand.
Providing that we recognize the complementarity between distribution, quality-of-life issues, productivity, and growth, Hill's effort provides a valuable starting point for agencies reconsidering how best to allocate their scarce resources. Perhaps a useful (and minor) refinement of his categories would be to envision economic development as focusing on firms and regions as centers of production with an emphasis on labor demand and capital supply, whereas community development focuses on households as the centers of consumption and as suppliers of labor. Both economic and community development organizations work with communities: economic development agencies as suppliers of social capital such as infrastructure, community development organizations as moderators of labor supply.
Viewing community and economic development in this manner can help sort out their respective roles. Consider the case of workforce training, an area where both community and economic development agencies have been under pressure in recent years to take greater initiative. According to the revised model above, training would fall mainly to community development organizations due to their focus on labor supply. This has been the EDA's approach since its inception. Usually, we do not engage in training activities directly, choosing instead to support the work of others by funding workforce development infrastructure, such as training centers and distance learning facilities.
Does this proposed division of responsibilities mean that local community development corporations (CDCs) should stop working directly with private firms? We do not believe so. Most CDCs working on economic development have usually done so because there is a void to fill locally. Where economic development needs are not being met adequately by other agencies, we cannot fault CDCs for stepping forward, especially when doing so supports their other efforts. The federal case is different precisely because there is so much concern about possible duplication of effort.
Hill goes on to argue that to increase the ability of the federal government to generate public goods, funding for local economic development efforts should be split into two types. Some funding should be awarded on a competitive basis. Selection criteria would include both the need and the capacity of the organization to make use of the funds provided (including a current strategic plan). Funding should require a large matching contribution and should be available to both governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Of course, the neediest communities cannot typically afford a large match. To remedy this problem, Hill argues that other grants should be available for capacity building (including planning) at the regional level. Hill's recommendations essentially describe the approach used by the EDA for many years. Public works and economic adjustment grants are available only to organizations that have undergone an approved Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy planning process.
11 EDA funding is available to both governmental and nongovernmental organizations in areas that demonstrate economic distress.
12 This funding requires a 50% local match from most applicants, with a sliding scale based on need. There is also tremendous competition for EDA funds because the agency can never afford to fund all the projects proposed. To complement these project-oriented funds, the EDA also funds planning and technical assistance for capacity building. Applicants for these grants need not demonstrate distress, although economic need is one of many factors considered in making awards.
AREAS OF CONCERN TO BOTH THORNBURGH AND HILL
Although Thornburgh and Hill disagree on important issues, such as agency consolidation and funding approaches, there are broad areas of common concern in their articles. In the sections that follow, we give these issues special attention. We also describe some specific steps that the EDA is taking to respond to the concerns raised. In many instances, these new policies are a direct response to suggestions offered in the NAPA and EDAC volumes.
Federal economic statistical capabilities. Both authors argue that the federal government should maintain and improve its statistic-gathering capabilities, especially at the regional level. We agree, but additional funding must be provided for this purpose. We also believe it makes sense to leave most data gathering to the Census Bureau and other agencies with specialized expertise in the area. For its part, the EDA has sought to make the existing statistical system more accessible to economic development practitioners. In 1998, for instance, the EDA funded researchers to prepare a user's guide to the socioeconomic data provided by the major federal agencies (Cortright & Reamer, 1998) . We have also funded research designed to help practitioners use existing data more creatively. As an example, the outmigration research of Feser and Sweeney (1998) developed statistical measures to help identify areas where outmigration may contribute to economic distress. In some instances, EDA research has also helped to identify important weaknesses in existing data. For instance, Polenske, Rockler, Kinsella-Thompson, and Mitter (1998) found substantial difficulties in using existing data to estimate infrastructure needs at the county level.
Regional analysis. Both authors share a concern that economic development activities take a regional focus. Thornburgh defines regions as collections of counties; Hill defines them in terms of labor markets. Both Thornburgh and Hill identify the EDA as a leader in regional analysis and policy. We appreciate the endorsement, but frankly, our grantees define their own regional boundaries. Organizationally, the EDA leaves funding decisions regarding local projects to our regional offices, where staff are most familiar with the needs and capabilities of applicants. We agree with Hill's concern for labor markets. Without having undertaken a formal analysis, our sense is that many EDA grantees operate at a scale somewhat below actual labor market areas.
More evaluation needed. Both authors argue for more program evaluation in federal agencies. Partly in response to this recommendation and partly due to ongoing reengineering efforts, the EDA now evaluates all of its programs on a rotating schedule. In addition, individual university centers and economic development districts are evaluated every third year. Even without considering the substantial investments the EDA has made to adopt improved performance measures under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the EDA now devotes a much larger share of its total research budget to evaluation. The real challenge is not to do more evaluation but to increase the utility of what we already do.
As an example, agency staff often find themselves under tremendous pressure to have evaluations done externally. This almost always means reinventing the wheel every time a new evaluation is done. With proper oversight, some of these evaluations could be conducted in-house, increasing the opportunity for institutional learning in the agencies being evaluated and allowing them to standardize procedures over time and across programs, to refine their questions more carefully, and ultimately to integrate evaluation into decision making more fully. 13 As these program evaluations become more routine, it may also be desirable to focus evaluations on more specific questions affecting individual programs.
We also need to recognize that we have been far more successful in evaluating job, output, and fiscal impacts than changes in productivity attributable to federal economic development policy. There is some recent and creative progress on this front. As an example, Jarmin (1999) uses the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) to evaluate productivity impacts attributable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP). After adjusting for important differences between client and nonclient plants, Jarmin finds that, between 1987 and 1992 , MEP clients experienced productivity growth as much as 16% greater than nonclients. This kind of analysis is more challenging in the EDA's case because our assistance does not go directly to private firms. Consequently, we cannot easily isolate establishments that benefit from EDA assistance from those that do not. Still, this is clearly a research area that needs further development.
Need for improved coordination across agencies. Regardless of whether federal economic development functions are consolidated, nearly everyone agrees that greater coordination between agencies is needed to reduce the complexity faced by communities undertaking economic Straub, Robinson / RESPONSE 263 development activities. The costs of poor coordination are especially burdensome in the most distressed communities, where development organizations often lack specialized staff and analytical resources to navigate the system (and to take advantage of the flexibility that does exist). Keeping this in mind, the EDA has recently made what we believe are significant steps in the right direction. To give just a few examples, the EDA has done the following:
· Commissioned a study to recommend improvements in the planning process we require of our grantees (Dabson, 1999) . Likewise, in 1998, the EDA held a conference with other federal agencies to reduce redundant planning requirements. Largely as a result of these efforts, the EDA now gives grant applicants considerable flexibility to meet EDA requirements by using plans they have previously developed for other agencies. · Entered into a cooperative program with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promote brownfields revitalization. This cooperation has included (a) creating a new position at the EDA to act as liaison with the EPA, (b) EDA assistance to the EPA in management of its revolving loan funds, and (c) joint funding of research. · Created a division of labor with the Department of Defense for base closings, whereby the EDA provides follow-on support after initial reuse plans are complete. · In conjunction with other federal agencies, prepared a strategic plan for coordinating economic development activities in Native American and Alaska Native communities. As part of this effort, the agencies now meet frequently to discuss ongoing activities. · Cooperated with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster prevention efforts. the EDA also provides FEMA with quick economic assessments after a disaster to help in designing the most appropriate response. · Developed an Economic Development Information Clearinghouse on the Internet to consolidate information about economic development programs throughout the federal government.
Taken together, we believe these steps mark a concerted effort by the EDA to help ease the confusion that public and economic practitioners face in trying to understand the federal system.
CONCLUSION
For 35 years, the EDA has helped distressed communities to develop and implement economic development strategies created locally. Promoting ongoing informed debate about the federal role in economic development is an important part of the EDA's job. We are pleased to be able to participate in these discussions and hope they will continue. We take these discussions seriously and have implemented many of the suggestions provided to us.
Despite the good economic conditions most Americans currently enjoy, the need for federal assistance remains high. In today's volatile economy, even apparently healthy regions can suddenly find themselves severely challenged by events such as plant closings, military downsizing, and changing trade relations. The federal government has a crucial role to play in assisting distressed communities to use and enhance the productive resources at their disposal. However, the federal role includes more than funding. Where federal assistance includes funding, that financial help cannot be unconditional.
The articles by Thornburgh and Hill, as well as feedback we receive every day from the communities we serve, make it clear that the EDA and other federal agencies must work even harder to offer coordinated programs and to reduce redundancy and administrative burden. Without action in these areas, continuing calls for program consolidation are likely, and if implemented, consolidation will almost certainly undermine the extent and quality of economic development assistance for distressed areas. Still, some test of reasonableness is needed regarding ongoing calls for reform. Today, the EDA spends about 5% of its total appropriation on salaries and expenses. That is a lean organization by anyone's definition, and it makes administrative reform difficult because people must be diverted from initiating and overseeing projects.
Despite the obvious challenges, these are exciting times for federal economic development. To be sure, not everyone has benefited from changing economic conditions, but there are tremendous opportunities today that were unthinkable just a few years ago. Furthermore, state and local economic development agencies are more creative than ever before. We at the EDA are privileged to work with these communities: helping them prepare strategies for development, funding the implementation of those strategies, helping the organizations involved leverage other funding sources, and disseminating lessons learned from these efforts to economic development practitioners nationally.
NOTES
1. As part of its normal grant application process, the EDA screens and disqualifies projects that result in local excess capacity.
2. The exception is funding for national programs, such as Research and National Technical Assistance. In recent years, these have consistently represented less than 1% of the EDA's program budget.
3. It can also be argued that federal involvement is justified because the federal government tends to rely on a more progressive set of taxes to fund its activities (more on income tax than on sales or property taxes). However, there is no inherent reason states cannot fund these activities from less regressive tax sources. Politically, of course, states have benefited tremendously from the existing arrangement because they can reap the benefits of federal spending without having to take the criticism for raising taxes to support those activities.
4. The EDA also provided funds allowing the National Association of State Development Agencies to prepare a guidebook designed to help state and local practitioners evaluate business development incentives (Poole, Erickcek, Iannone, McCrea, & Salem, 1999) . This study was called for specifically by NAPA, and it is mentioned by Thornburgh. 5. The history of U.S. economic development practice is littered with cases where innovative ideas that worked in one place were copied unsuccessfully elsewhere-often with federal help. Subsequent analysis has often shown that these efforts fail because of insufficient concern for the local context in which the programs are adopted. Two obvious examples of this would be tourism facilities and science parks. For reviews of these areas, see Baade and Dye (1988) and Luger and Goldstein (1991) .
6. In 1977, the EDA's total regular appropriations (excluding salaries and disaster assistance) were $917 million. By 1997, this figure had declined to $354 million (-63%). Over the same period, funding for research and evaluation declined from $7.1 million to just $500,000 (-93%). All figures are in 1997 constant dollars, adjusted using the Gross Domestic Product implicit price deflator (Economic Development Administration, 1978 .
7. A follow-up to this research by EDA field staff yields significantly lower but still impressive estimates of $5.6 of private investment leveraged for every dollar of EDA funding (Burchell & Devance-Manzini, 1999) .
8. The EDA provides annual planning support to about 320 economic development districts and 64 tribal organizations. In 1997, average annual funding was $55,000 per year for economic development districts.
9. As an example, the EDA and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) both support brownfields investment with RLFs. However, EPA's RLFs tend to support site assessment, clean-up, and remediation. By contrast, EDA's RLFs usually support redevelopment and infrastructure improvements.
10. In this sense, the fundamental contribution of Piore and Sabel (1984) was not to demonstrate the superiority of economic development based on flexible production but to show that local economies need not evolve in a predetermined fashion based on Fordist principles. Of course, the fact that communities have choices also makes it critical that economic development decisions be made in the open. This is one reason that federal agencies tend to operate through local government and other public organizations-to ensure that federally supported activities have been subjected to public scrutiny.
11. Minor details of this process changed when the EDA adopted new regulations in 1999. However, the essential process has remained unchanged for many years. Regulations describing EDA funding eligibility and uses are described in 13 CFR Chapter III (64 FR 22. February 3, 1999) . General requirements are covered in Sections 301-304. Public Works is covered in §305, Economic Adjustment is covered in §308, Planning is covered in §306, and Technical Assistance is covered in §307.
12. Nongovernmental organizations must be working in cooperation with political subdivision of a state or Native American tribe (13 CFR. §301.1).
13. Of course, this applies only in those cases where there are no other good reasons for doing the evaluation externally, such as a need for specialized expertise or scale.
